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Reasonably  astute  observers  by  now  are  certainly  aware  that,
how  agriculture  is  structured  does  make  a  difference.  To  appease
those  with the  "if it isn't broken,  don't fix  it"  mentality,  I  will not
suggest  that  it  is  equally  clear  how  agriculture  ought  to  be  struc-
tured  if  (or  when)  structural  modification  becomes  a public  policy
objective.
I  do  not  propose  to  discuss  the desirability  of structural  change.
Rather,  my  purpose  is  to  examine  the  impacts  of  market  policy
upon  structural  change;  that  is,  the  relationships  between  market
policy  and the structure  or organization  of agriculture.  My emphasis
is  mainly  at  the  farm  level,  focusing  on  market  policies  for  farm
products and the structure of the farming industries.
The  intellectual  underpinnings  of  market  policy  rest  primarily
upon  industrial  organization  theory.  This  theory  holds that the way
in  which  industries  are  structured  affects  the  behavior  of  firms  in
their  markets,  and  vice  versa,  and  that both structure  and  conduct
influence  performance  which  is the  end  result of economic  activity
by those firms.
Market  policies  can  be  directed  toward  both  structure  and  con-
duct.  However,  the  direction  of  causality  is  not  always  clear,  that
is,  whether  market  policy  influences,  or  responds  to,  market  struc-
ture  and  behavior.  Probably  both.  This  does  not  obscure  the  fact
that  market  policy  and  industry  structure  are  inexorably  inter-
related.  Structural  goals  cannot  be achieved  in the absence  of com-
patible  market  policy  - otherwise,  the marketing  system will evolve
unguided  in  response  to  economic  opportunism,  technological
development,  and  economic  and  social  power rather  than toward  a
specific target or idealized objective.
1Appreciation  for  helpful  comments  is  expressed  to  Walter  Armbruster,  Wallace  Barr
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any  purposeful policy to achieve structural change. In most instances,
however,  it must be joined with other policies  to fully realize struc-
tural  objectives.  This  is  to  say  that market  policy  is  necessary,  but
not necessarily  sufficient.
What is Market Policy ?
Market  policy  concerns  the subset of public  policies that directly
influences  the process  of economic exchange or transaction between
economic  entities.  The  purpose  is to guide  the exchange  process  in
such  a  way  that  it  facilitates  achievement  of the  goals  of  society,
or  at  least  the  goals  of  those  in  positions  of  sufficient  political
power  to  sway  public  policy.  Goals  for  market  policy  can  include
industry structure.
More  frequently,  goals  are expressed  in terms  such  as "generating
prices that are  adequate  in  view of production costs, or that provide
sufficient  rewards  for  superior  entrepreneurship,"  "to  provide
equality  in  bargaining  power,"  "to  assure  access  to  markets,"  "to
assure  a  viable  choice  among  competing  vendors,"  or  perhaps  the
grandest  platitude  of all,  "to establish  and maintain  orderly  market
conditions."
To  the  extent  that  structure  is  explicitly  recognized  in  market
policy,  it  is  usually  viewed  in  the  context  of achieving  other goals
rather  than  as  an  objective  in  itself.  Nonetheless,  market structure
is  one  of  two  key  variables  which is directly  influenced  by market
policy  aimed  at achieving  the variously  stated  declarations  of  "Con-
gressional  intent"  and/or the  "public interest."  The other is  market
conduct,  which  often  indirectly  impacts  upon  market  structure.
Thus,  despite  the expressed  goals of various  market policies, industry
structure is likely to be affected.
Market  structure  includes  factors  such  as  market  concentration
reflected  in  the  number  and  relative  size  of  firms  in the  market,
the  extent to which  products  sold  in a market by different  vendors
are  differentiated,  and  the  number  and  height  of  barriers  to  the
entry  of  new  firms  into  the market  and the exit of old firms from
the market. Also, the extent to which firms in a market are vertically,
horizontally,  conglomerately,  or  multinationally  integrated  is  of
increasing importance.
Market conduct  refers to the way that firms act in their input and
product  markets.  Important  conduct  variables  include  pricing meth-
ods,  the  quantity  and  type  of  products  produced  and  efforts  to
affect  the  image  of  those  products  through  advertising  and  other
means  of  promotion,  and  methods  of  harmonizing  behavior  with
customers  and suppliers  (vertical  coordination)  and with rivals (tacit
or overt collusion).
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duct abound.  Structure  is directly  affected  by much of this nation's
antitrust  policy  which  is  generally  aimed  at  the  preservation  of
competition and prevention of monopoly. The Sherman Act of 1890
set the  stage by declaring  any combination  of firms which results in
restraint  of trade  to  be illegal.  Mergers  between  firms which  would
lessen  competition  were  prohibited  by  the  Celler-Kefauver  Act  of
1950.  And  uniquely  affecting  agriculture,  combinations  between
meatpackers  and  certain  mergers  involving  meatpackers  were  de-
clared  unlawful  by the Packers  and  Stockyards Act of 1921 in order
to prevent  collusion  and to maintain a competitive  market structure.
In  contrast,  concentration  and economic combinations  have been
facilitated  in parts of the agricultural sector through policies such as
those embodied in the Capper-Volstead  Act of 1922, the Agricultural
Marketing  Agreement  Act of 1937,  and various  commodity  promo-
tion  laws  such  as the  Cotton  Research  and Promotion  Act of  1966
and the Egg  Research  and Consumer Information Act of 1974. Such
policies  have  generally  been  enacted  on  the  rationale  that  farming
is too dispersed for effective market control.
Policies  affecting  market  conduct  are  even  more  pervasive.  Price
discrimination  in favor of large firms was outlawed by the Robinson-
Patman  Act  of 1936.  The  Clayton  and  Federal  Trade  Commission
Acts  in  1914  and  the  Wheeler-Lea  Act of 1938 proscribe  as unfair
any  behavior  which  lessens  competition  among  rival  firms  in  a
market.  Specific to agriculture,  pricing  behavior  has been influenced
as  a  matter  of public policy  since  the inauguration  of price reports
on  spot  commodity  markets  in  1915.  Product  differentiation  (or
lack  thereof)  has  been  affected  through  public  programs  for  the
development  of  grade  standards  and  actual  product  classification.
Various  discriminatory  marketing  practices  are  made  unlawful  by
the  Perishable  Agricultural  Commodities  Act  of  1930,  the  Agri-
cultural  Fair  Practices  Act  of  1967, the Commodity  Exchange  Act
of 1954, the U.S. Warehouse  Act of 1916, among others.
The intent of most trade practice  policies  is to encourage  market
behavior  that  is  more  similar  to  the  theoretical  concept  of  pure
competition  than  it  would  otherwise  be.  Some,  such  as  the  Agri-
cultural  Fair  Practices  Act,  are  designed  to  encourage  less  perfect
competition,  although  they  are  frequently  enacted  under the guise
of creating  "countervailing  power"  for farmers.  In  almost all cases,
however,  policies  which  influence  conduct  indirectly  impact  upon
structure  by molding market  behavior  into a more,  or less, competi-
tive pattern.
Market Conditions for a Dispersed Agriculture
Before  turning  to  market  policy  options  for  influencing  the
structural  evolution  of American  farming, it is instructive to examine
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dispersed,  competitive  industry  as  compared  to  one  that  is  highly
concentrated.
Perhaps  the  most  unique  characteristic  of  a  truly  dispersed  in-
dustry is that the firms  therein  have  only  market  ties to other firms
in their economic  sector. That is, firms deal with suppliers, customers
and rivals  through arms-length  transactions  conducted in accordance
with  impersonal  rules  of the marketplace.  By  implication,  this  is  an
atomistic,  competitive,  open  market  system.  Brimyer  and  Flinch-
baugh  made  this  point  succinctly  in  the  "Who  Will  Control  U.S.
Agriculture?"  project when  they labelled  this type of farm organiza-
tion as the "dispersed,  open market agriculture".
This  concept  of  a dispersed  agriculture  precludes  the use of con-
tracts  between  farmers  and  others  in  the  marketing  channel.  By
contracts  I  refer  to  any  form  of private  agreement  made  prior  to
the actual exchange of title, including production contracts, resource-
providing  contracts,  and  marketing  contracts, treaties or agreements.
To  argue  the  opposite,  that  a  contract  farmer  is  still  an  inde-
pendent  entrepreneur  because  he can  decide  whether  to contract  or
not  - whether  to  produce  or  not  - is  much  like  arguing  that  a
factory  worker  is  an  independent  economic  entity  because  he  can
decide whether to go to work or not.
The  market  system  in  this  situation  is  closely  akin  to  Adam
Smith's  concept  of  a  self-regulating  market.  Students  of  classical
economics  know  this  as  the  perfectly  competitive  market  and  stu-
dents  of  neoclassical  economics  know  it  as  atomistic  competition.
The  most  significant  characteristics  of  this  marketing  system  are
familiar  to every  student  of economics,  and their relation to existing
market policy is straightforward:
1)  Firms  are  too  small  to  individually  influence  the  market  -
hence, antitrust and antimerger policies;
2) Products  are  standardized  and  nondifferentiated  - hence,
grade standards and classification programs;
3)Price  is  the  primary  allocator  of resources  and  is  established
competitively  rather  than  administratively  or  by  bilateral
bargaining  - hence,  price  reporting  and  fair  trade  practice
policies;
4) Equal  access  to  information  on  market  conditions  and  equal
rights  to  act  based  upon  that  information  - hence,  market
news and anti-exclusionary  policies; and
5)Impersonal  rules  govern  the  exchange  process  - hence,  anti-
coercion and deception policies.
One  final  characteristic  of  this  system  is  worthy  of recognition.
Market  behavior  of  firms  is  generally  explained  by microeconomic
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armed  with  considerable  training  in  microeconomics,  mourn  the
passing  of  the  dispersed  farm  system.  To  understand  the  behavior
of firms in  other systems requires  new investments in the intellectual
capital  of agricultural  economics.  It  may  not explain, however,  why
many  others are concerned.
Market Conditions  for a Concentrated  Agriculture
One  important  distinguishing  characteristic  of  a  concentrated
economic  sector is the  existence  of numerous nonmarket ties among
firms.  By  and  large,  this  means  vertical  integration  arrangements
between  farmers and their suppliers and/or customers. These arrange-
ments  take many forms, including production and resource-providing
contracts,  ownership  integration,  marketing  contracts  and  other
private  marketing  treaties  and  agreements.  Additionally,  some
horizontal  aggregation  of farm  enterprises  may  occur,  most notably
farmers joining together for group action.
In  essence,  vertical  integration  creates  a  concentrated  system
because  decision-making  flexibility,  at  least regarding  many  market
variables  such  as  price,  product  quality,  and timing of delivery,  are
given  over  by  the  farmer  to  a  contractor  or  integrator.  That  is,
management  becomes  concentrated,  usually  in  the  hands  of  an
off-farm agribusiness firm.
These  are  normally  large  corporations  with  extensive  operations
in  the  farm  supply  and/or  food  manufacturing  and  distribution
industries.  Concentration  occurs  regardless  of  who  actually  owns
and operates the farm enterprise  - control of the production-market-
ing  system  becomes  concentrated  as  managerial  decision-making
shifts  to  relatively  few,  large  scale  integrators  or systems  managers.
Perhaps,  it  is  misleading  to  even  discuss  market  conditions  in  a
managerially  concentrated  agriculture.  In  an  integrated  system,
economic  coordination  between  farmers  and  their  suppliers  and
customers  is not accomplished  through  spot transactions  negotiated
in a competitive  market  environment. The market as such is replaced
by  an  exchange  system  within  which many  and sometimes  all terms
of exchange are administratively  specified by management.
Contracts,  private  agreements,  and  joint  ownership  are  all  in-
struments  for effectuating  such administered exchange.  Even in cases
of  horizontal  farm  combines  for  group  action,  many  marketing
decisions  are  transferred  to  collective  management  where  bilateral
bargaining replaces the competitive marketing process.
A  few  reasons  why  this  integrated,  managerially  concentrated
system  evolves  in  an  industrialized  agriculture  deserve  mention  as
they  explain  much  of  the  change  from  market  to  administered
exchange.  Specialization,  interdependence,  and  merchandising  are
key  factors.  On-farm  work  activities  have become  more  specialized
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restructured  into  off-farm  enterprises.  Feed  formulation,  fuel  pro-
duction,  and  product  marketing  are  examples.  This  increases  inter-
dependence  among  operationally  separate  activities,  and  increases
both risks  and  costs to  all participants  if someone  else  fails to per-
form satisfactorily.
The  task  of  coordinating  these  highly  interdependent  activities
often  becomes  too  much  for  price  changes  alone  to  manage.  The
more  traditional  impersonal  market  gives  way  to  more  personal
methods  of  resource  allocation,  that  is,  management  direction  or
administration.  Also,  merchandising  has  evolved  as  a  means  of  re-
ducing  the  risks  of  losing  customers.  But,  when  massive  expendi-
tures  are  made  to  presell  customers,  risks  of  insufficient  supply
increase.  This  further  erodes  the  willingness  of  managers  to  rely
upon  the  uncertainties  of  open  market  supplies  and  adds  further
pressure for specified or administered  exchange.
Prices  in  this  system  tend  toward  instruments  of equity  rather
than  short  term  allocative  signals.  Prices  are  the  method  by which
relative  shares  of  the  economic  rewards  are  determined  for  indi-
vidual  participants,  including  farmers.  In  the  concentrated  system,
competition  in  price  making  becomes  much  less  important  than
comparability,  that  is,  assuring  that  the  price  one  person  receives
is comparable  with  what others  receive  who  are  doing similar  work.
This,  in  turn, encourages  price  establishment  through  administra-
tive  decision,  bilateral  bargaining  and  by  formulation  from  various
indices.  Some  existing  market  policies  support  this  system.  For
example,  administrative  pricemaking  is  facilitated  by  the  milk
market  order  and  price  support  programs  as  is  bilaterial  bargaining
by the Capper-Volstead  and Agricultural Fair Practices Acts.
It  also  gives  rise  to  several  of the current market  policy debates.
Intermittent  efforts  to  enact  a  national  agricultural  bargaining  act
provide  one  example.  Another  is the wide ranging policy discussions
concerning formula pricing of eggs, wholesale meat, and livestock and
the  efficacy  of  the  price  reports  upon  which  these  formula  prices
are  based,  in  particular  the  National  Provisioner's  "Yellow  Sheet"
and Urner Barry's "Producers'  Price-Current."
Economic  input  into  policy  decisions  that  address  market  or
exchange  phenomena  in  large  scale,  managerially  concentrated
systems  is  complicated  by  the  inability  of received  microeconomic
theory  to  predict,  even  approximately,  organizational  response  to
various  stimuli.  For  one  very  basic  example,  the  traditional  profit
maximization  objective  function  is  supplanted  by  a  complex  or-
ganizational  objective  which  appears  to  include  variables  such  as
economic  growth,  organizational  stability,  executive  perks,  or-
ganizational  slack,  and  a  targeted  market  share,  all  subject  to  the
earning of a minimum acceptable level of profits.
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behavior  and  industrial  organization  are  required.  These  theories
cannot  continue  to  be  viewed  by agricultural  economists  as illegiti-
mate  offspring  of the  economics  profession  if  we  are  to  provide
constructive input into policy  discussions  concerning a concentrated
agriculture.
Market Policy Alternatives to Achieve a Dispersed  Agriculture
Understanding  the  relationship  between  market  conditions  and
industry  structure  helps  to  identify  market  policy options that are
consistent  with  a given structural objective.  Some are rather obvious,
particularly  when  the goal  is to create  or at least facilitate the emer-
gence of a dispersed industry.
It  has  already  been  shown  that  several  of  the  existing  market
policies  facilitate  the  open  market  system  and  thus  should  help
maintain  a  dispersed  agricultural  sector.  Yet,  it  is  obvious  that,
over  time,  U.S. agriculture  is  increasingly  deviating  from  a dispersed
structure.  A recent  analysis  by  Jim  Shaffer  and  myself  has  shown
that  concentrated  management  structures,  including  both  vertical
ownership  and  contract  integration,  currently  account  for  at  least
one  fourth  of  all  U.S.  farm production  and perhaps  as much  as  40
percent.  This  excludes  horizontal  concentration  through  collective
action  which,  if  included,  could  easily  put  the  relative  share  for
concentrated  agriculture  above  the  50 percent mark. Thus, one must
conclude  that  existing  open  market  policies  are  ineffective  and/or
insufficient in and of themselves in assuring a dispersed system.
The  most  obvious  market  policy  choice  to  achieve  a  dispersed
farming  sector  is  to  proscribe  any  form  of nonmarket,  integrative
arrangement  or  linkage  between  farm  enterprises  and others in the
food  and  fiber production  and marketing  system.  This  is  somewhat
akin to  Carroll Bottum's policy  suggestion  of several  years ago that,
to  maintain  open  markets  in  agriculture,  buyers  of  farm  products
be  required  to  purchase  some  minimum  share  of their acquisitions
through  an  organized,  open  market  such  as  a  terminal  or  auction.
It  is  unfortunate  that  Bottum's  suggestion  did  not  receive  more
attention  at  the  time.  Policymakers  have  largely  ignored  the struc-
tural  and  policy  implications  of  the  steady  erosion  of  the  open
market  by  the  persistent  pressure  to  reduce  risks through  contract
farming,  private  marketing  treaties  and  agreements,  and  vertical
integration.
To  assure  a dispersed  agriculture,  the "market share" requirement
is  insufficient.  At  best,  it would result  in a mixed system  of mana-
gerially  independent  and  integrated  farms.  Even  though  it  would
assure  the  existence  of  open  market  institutions,  it would not pre-
vent  the  use  of nonmarket  institutions  through  which  considerable
decision-making  independence  by  farmers  is  given  over  to  a rela-
tively few.
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private  agreements,  and  other nonmarket  linkages  at  the farm  gate.
Such  a policy  could be effectuated either through an outright ban on
the  use  of  nonmarket,  integrative  arrangements  or  by  a  mandate
that all farm production  must be sold on an open market.
At  least  one  precedent  for  such  a  policy  exists  in  the  western
world.  Concern  by  some  Canadians in the late  1950's about industri-
alization  of  swine  production  and  the  potential  for  broiler-type
contract integration  in this industry  lead  to the  formation of a pork
producers  marketing  board  in the province  of Ontario.  In the  early
1960's, the Ontario board developed  a province-wide  open marketing
system  for slaughter hogs  which  utilized  a teletype  auction network
for  interconnecting  all livestock  assembly  yards  and  meat packers in
the  province.  This  was  a  forerunner  of today's concept  of an  elec-
tronic  market.  The  board  also  mandated  that  all  hogs  produced  in
the province were to be sold on this open market system. That policy
remains in effect today.
No  similar  policy  decision  was  made  in  Quebec,  the  other major
hog  producing  area  in  Canada.  Currently,  Quebec  and  Ontario
each  account  for about  35 percent of that nation's total hog produc-
tion.  Today  there  is  virtually  no  open  market  for hogs  in  Quebec.
Contract  and  ownership  integration  dominate.  By  contrast,  con-
tracting  is  nonexistent  in  Ontario  and,  while  one  meatpacker  has
some  confinement  hog production  facilities,  it has to  compete  with
all  other  packers in the  open market  for the  acquisition  of the hogs
produced  therein.  One  final  comparison:  there are  now  4.3 times  as
many  farmers  producing  hogs  in  Ontario  as  in  Quebec,  with  each
province producing about 3  million market hogs annually.
This  experience  suggests that  a  mandatory  open market policy  by
itself  might  be  sufficient  to  facilitate  a  dispersed  structure.  Of
course,  there  are  trade-offs.  The  technological  imperative  for  close
nonmarket  coordination  in  an  industrialized  system  is  disrupted.
Inefficiencies,  slower  growth,  and  inequities  vis-a-vis  others  in  in-
dustrialized  sectors are possible  outcomes.
Short  of a mandatory  market  policy  there  are a number of policy
actions  that  can  improve  the viability  of organized  markets  in  agri-
culture,  thus  perhaps  slowing  the  transition  toward  nonmarket
concentration.  First,  existing  market  facilitating  programs  such  as
grading  and  product  standardization,  price  reporting,  and  market
news  could be strengthened and expanded.  Some form of mandatory
price  reporting,  or at least  enforcement  of current laws that require
truthful  reporting,  would  help  slow  the  erosion  of  reliable  market
information.  Next is  more  vigorous  enforcement  of antitrust policy,
including  clear  and  enforceable  antimerger  guidelines.  These  would
need  to  apply  to  farmer  cooperatives  as  well  as  to  other  business
firms.
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open,  organized  marketing  methods  which  can  meet  the  complex
coordination  needs  of  an  industrialized  agriculture.  Computerized
or  electronic  markets  provide  one  possibility.  Finally,  consideration
could  be  given  to  revocation  of  the  Capper-Volstead  Act  and  the
Agricultural  Marketing  Agreement  Act,  effectively  forcing  farmers
into competition with one another.
Market Policy Alternatives to Achieve a Concentrated  Agriculture
Finally,  let us  look briefly at some market policy options that can
help  to  achieve  a concentrated  farming  sector.  In  a  sense,  these  are
"mirror images"  of the dispersed  policy alternatives.  As was the case
above, this list is illustrative but not exhaustive.
Several  policy  actions  could  be  taken  to enhance collective action
by farmers.  These  include  passage  of a "union  shop"  type of collec-
tive  bargaining  law  for farm  producers,  modification  of the Capper-
Volstead  Act  to specifically  allow intercooperative  mergers and joint
ventures  between  cooperatives  and  other  agribusiness  corporations,
and  broadening  the  commodity  coverage  of market  orders.  Market
facilitating  programs  such  as  market  news and  grading and standard-
ization  could  be  sharply  curtailed  or  even  eliminated.  Efforts  to
develop  electronic  markets  or  other  innovative  approaches  to  or-
ganized marketing could be forestalled.
Even  greater  deficiencies  and  legal  roadblocks  could  be  wrenched
upon  our  antitrust  policies  and  enforcements  thereof.  Or,  antitrust
policy  could  be  foregone  in  entirety.  Consideration  could  also  be
given  to  the  treatment  of  agriculture  as  a  public  utility  with  the
appropriate  controlling  body  constituted  from  among  consumer
activists,  organized  labor,  government  regulators,  elected  officials,
lawyers,  agribusiness executives,  and perhaps even a farmer.
Alternatively,  we  can  do  nothing  different  from  our  current
pragmatic  mix  of  structurally  inconclusive  or  nondirective  market
policies.
Final Comment
It  was  mentioned  earlier  that  market  policy  is  only  one  policy
element  which  can  affect  structure,  and that market  policy  alone  is
probably  insufficient  to  achieve  a  specific  structural  objective.  By
like  token,  compatible  market  policy  is  necessary  to  achieving  any
structural goal.
The  fact  that  we  currently  observe  a partially  dispersed,  partially
concentrated  structure  to  farming  is  at  least  in  part  a reflection  of
our  existing  mixture  of  competition  enhancing  and  competition
restricting  policy  goals.  This  may  reflect  an  even  more  basic  goal
conflict  between  equity  and efficiency.  Until such basic goal conflict
is  resolved,  emergence  of market  policies,  as  well  as structural  poli-
cies, with a clear sense of direction  is highly unlikely.
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